Trade wars and tariff increases are a breakdown of the system that makes sustained globalisation possible. One of the most infamous episodes, associated with the radical contraction of world trade during the Slump, was apparently triggered by the 1930 US Hawley-Smoot tariff. Simulated optimum tariff policies to achieve plausible government objectives show the reasons for the failure of cooperation. Britain is not worse off in a Nash tariff equilibrium than with a co-operative strategy. Nor is the US when the alternative optimum cooperative equilibrium is that obtained when all nations are assigned equal weight (as are national voters in supranational organisations). So international institution formation or operation was problematic-any benefits from foreign cooperation were small. Since international cooperation on one issue was difficult, cooperation on many -through the cross-issue bargaining attempted at the 1933 London Conference-was well nigh impossible. Optimum coordination across policy instruments nonetheless did yield high returns for policy; the more instruments available, the less extreme values each needed to take. Such coordination was more likely to be achieved nationally than internationally.
Trade Wars and the Slump
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The Great Depression period is the one major break in the peacetime march of globalisation during the last two centuries. This can be demonstrated with a simple index of the extent to which international economic relations pervade everyday life throughout the world -exports per head. Angus Maddison's (1995 Maddison's ( , 2001 
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For this ending of globalisation there are at least three types of interpretation or explanations (James 2000). They are self-destruction, backlash (resentment against supposed injustices of global economy (O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) ), and weakness in international regulation. Each can be shown to have played some part in the inter-war collapse. Traditional institutions of international economic cooperation were abandoned without being replaced by superior arrangements, despite continuing efforts. The purpose of the present paper is to explore the tensions, in particular for trade policy, that explain the failure of the framework of international economic regulation between the world wars.
The following section outlines the sequence of events behind the policy-induced contraction of trade during the slump. Section two discusses the institutional framework and structural factors that prevented such an occurrence during the nineteenth century and that broke down in the inter-war years. The reaction function approach to analysing trade wars and cooperative and non-coooperative policy equilibria is presented next. Section four outlines quantifies the quantifying of these policy equilibria. The empirical specification of the tariff policy model is sketched in section five. Section six reports and analyses simulations of policy equilibria. Some conclusions are drawn about the institutional and structural conditions for continuing globalisation.
1.The Hawley-Smoot Tariff War
Between 1929 and 1932 the volume of world trade declined by one quarter.
Five years later, the 1929 peak had still not been recovered (League 1942 p68) . Much of the decline was of course due to the collapse of incomes but a substantial portion was a consequence of policy. In any event, some of the income drop was precipitated by trade policy. Crucini and Kahn's (1996) real business cycle CGE model, distinguishing intermediate good trade, finds most of trade contraction during the Great Depression was due to the trade restrictions, as were falls of several percent in international output and investment. Madsden (2001) estimates that real world trade decline of 8 percent was due to discretionary increases in tariffs, 5 percent to deflation-induced tariff increases and 6 percent to non-tariff barriers 1 . The trigger for much of the contractionary trade policy at first sight was American protectionism.
Pressure for protection from falling prices for mid-Western wheat farmers became irresistible during Herbert Hoover's 1928 campaign for the US Presidency. But according to the League of Nations, the real explanation for the unprecedentedly high 1930 American Hawley-Smoot tariff was continuing US suspicion of the import trade (League 1942 126) . In Europe, the 'storm centre of high protectionism' was the Danubian region (League 1942 114) .
Once the US legislative process was underway in 1929, log-rolling led rapidly to higher tariffs proposals in other sectors as well; the Hawley-Smoot Bill was modified more than 1100 times. The precarious trade policy equilibrium broke down in the summer of 1929. 34 foreign protests were lodged with the US Department of State.
Before the end of the year intensified agricultural protection was introduced in Germany, France and Italy (League 1942 52,54; Jones 1934 (Eichengreen 1990 ). Neville
Chamberlain stated in 1932 that the Import Duties Act would be used in negotiation with foreign countries (Conybeare 1985 166) .
The US tariff was designed to minimise international pressure for revision.
Nations that discriminated against US products were to be penalised with an additional 50 percent duty. But preferences for US goods-through Most Favoured Nation (MFN)
bargaining-would not be reciprocated. (Oye 1992 77) . Not surprisingly then, use of the MFN clause declined radically in the 1930s (Snyder 1948 240-1) . Only in 1934, with the US Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, was there a reversal of trade policy (Irwin 1998 ).
For the US, Eichengreen (1989) maintained that the direct macro outcomes of the 1930 Hawley-Smoot US tariff were probably expansionary, even when feedbacks through foreign retaliation are included. In any event they were small. Irwin (1998) focusses on the efficiency losses for the US economy, but agrees the effects were minor; the partial equilibrium approach suggested a 20 percent rise in duties, sufficient to increase the relative price of imports by 4-6 percent. Both accept that any significant impact was through the stability of the international monetary system and the international capital market.
There were other trade wars that followed Hawley-Smoot; that between France and Italy in 1932 and 1933 adopted an extreme 'tit for tat' form (Foreman-Peck 1995 199) . Bilateralism and trade blocs sprang up to free international economic relations from the consequences of these conflicts. Recent re-assessments have been more favourable to such arrangements. Kitson and Solomou (1995) 'Britain lost the will and lacked the power to enforce international cooperation as she had done in the nineteenth century' (Kindleberger 1978 167 citing Condliffe).
America's Hawley-Smoot tariff symbolised US unwillingness to take responsibility for world economic stability in these years (Kindleberger 1978 171) .
Viewed from continental Europe, rather than across the Atlantic, the case for nineteenth century British hegemony looks less convincing (McGillivray, McLean, Pahre and Schonhardt-Bailey, 2002) . There certainly were trade wars in the later nineteenth century -for example between Russia and Germany in the 1890s (Foreman-Peck 1995 113) . Throughout them, the world's then largest trader, Britain, remained committed to free trade. Whether this amounts to hegemonic leadership' is a moot point. Single issue institutions based on bilateral bargaining or self-enforcement where much less in need of hegemonic leadership than multiple issue institutions.
These last were subject to much greater transactions costs and were less liable to cooperate spontaneously (cf Keohane 1984 89-92 With the restoration of exchange stability through adoption of the gold standard in the second half of the twenties, the 'pro-gold standard' prediction is that protectionism should fall, Andrew Marrison (2000) questions whether there was some tendency to reduce barriers with the greater exchange rate stability of the later 1920s.
The rise in agricultural tariffs from 1927 testified to continuing instability he believed.
Downward pressure on wheat prices in particular was the proximate cause, in turn because the Fed especially was not playing by the rules of the gold standard 'game'.
American failure to follow the rules mattered especially because US output was so much greater than those of the three largest European powers combined. Among others Barry Eichengreen (1992) and Peter Temin (1989) contend the gold standard had outlived its usefulness by the interwar years.. But there was more to international cooperation than establishing the right institutions. They also needed to work properly.
If they did not, the most efficient solution could well be to ensure that they did operate correctly, not necessarily to abandon them. An arrangement that would benefit all parties would entail, in return for British and American conceding that they would stabilize their exchange rates, the French agreeing to reduce their tariffs and quotas (Eichengreen 1992 322 Conference was a complete failure.
Trade Policy Reactions and Trade Policy Equilibria
This failure to achieve sufficient international economic cooperation between the world wars can be analysed by comparing the conditions for cooperative and non-cooperative policy equilibria. They offer a theoretical representation of the dilemma that regulation of globalisation is intended to prevent. The conditions can be established with policy reaction functions. In the field of trade policy, the reaction function shows how a country would set its own tariff in response to foreign tariffs.
Each point on the function can be regarded as the best tariff policy value, given the country's policy objectives and the foreign country's tariff.
Johnson ( Even those governments with full employment in the 1920s were concerned to maintain or boost short run output because they were apprehensive about unemployment, once they ran into the Slump after 1929 3 . They were also worried about the deflationary consequences of falling prices (as shown by, for example, the Hawley-Smoot tariff and Roosevelt's gold policy). In addition they wished to support central banks' maintenance of the gold standard, and so were concerned about the current balance on the foreign exchanges 4 . A negative demand shock, a fall in the exchange rate or a deterioration in the current balance could shift a tariff reaction function.
In fig. 2 , the two axes are the deviations of target variables from desired values.
The costs of deviations fall as the iso-cost curves approach the origin. The constraint on cost minimisation is given by the macro-economy, the implications of which for the target variables are represented by the diagonal line. A higher foreign tariff causes a deterioration in the current balance and a lower price level. This shifts outwards the stylised constraint relating the achievable values of the policy goals. A higher minimum level of policy costs is thereby attainable. Conversely a higher level of domestic tariffs could initially draw in the constraint towards the origin when there is less than full employment, by switching expenditure towards domestic output and employment.
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Each cost minimising response to different levels of foreign and domestic trade controls is a point on the reaction function. Reaction functions slope upwards from left to right insofar as a country will normally set a higher tariff to protect its own industry and/or balance of payments when foreign country tariffs are higher. Higher foreign tariffs reduce export earnings and output that otherwise might have protected the balance of payments and/or employment. Hence the domestic tariff must be raised to try to attain target values of these objectives.
The Johnson (1954) formulation has reaction functions with the opposite gradients (Grossman and Richardson 1985) . When the foreign country tariff is zero the home country optimal response is to set the optimal tariff, one that exploits the home country market power by shifting the terms of trade. When the foreign tariff is positive, the home country generally optimises by setting a lower tariff. Since the higher foreign tariff reduces the demand for home country goods, there is usually less to be gained from exploiting the terms of trade, so the home country sets less than the original 'optimal tariff'. The assumed objective is however so far removed from real governments' policy concerns that the policy equilibria can be off little empirical interest 5 .
[FIG 3 HERE]
Suppose in figure 3 the home tariff begins at T1 (after some change in circumstances such as one that has shifted downwards the foreign reaction function).
The foreign country's tariff reaction (T1*) to T1 is given by the foreign reaction function. In response, the home economy's reaction function determines a lower tariff level, T2. The foreigners then reduce their tariff to T2*, a smaller cut than the home country's, because of the shallower gradient of the foreign reaction function. With successively smaller reductions the tariff levels approach the equilibria of Te and Te*.
When each country knows the other's reaction function, they are likely to jump to the new equilibrium without going through the convergence process step by step.
The intersection of the tariff reaction functions, where none of the 'players' has an incentive to change policy, is the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium 6 .
Other policy equilibria entail one or more 'players' being off their reaction curves. For instance a 'Stackelberg leader' is willing to choose a tariff value that neutralises the reactions of trading partners (followers). This is one interpretation of what Cordell Hull hoped to achieve at the 1933 London conference or of the actual US tariff reductions in the early years of the GATT. The leader can also be interpreted as the first mover. The Stackelberg equilibrium thus offers a formal representation of the 'hegemonic stability' view of interwar trade policy in particular and of the conditions for a stable international economic system more generally.
A cooperative equilibrium has all partners off their reaction functions, for example avoiding the rising spiral of tariffs and quotas of a trade war. If long term national economic welfare were the only arguments in government's objective functions their cooperative equilibrium would be at zero tariff rates. In such equilibria all parties can be better off than at the Nash point. They must however be able to agree on how to share the gains from cooperation. Figure 4 identifies the three policy equilibria, Nash non-cooperative, cooperative and Stackelberg leadership. Where the reaction functions intersect, at N, is the Nash equilibrium. For both economies N is at a higher level of policy makers' costs than could be attained by cooperation. The preferred points for the domestic and foreign economies are respectively A and A*. If they can negotiate a compromise level of their tariffs, a cooperative equilibrium, at some point on the contract curve joining A and A*, they will both be better off than at N. If the domestic economy chooses its tariff taking into consideration the reaction of the foreign policy makers, it can also achieve a higher equilibrium level of welfare at S, the Stackelberg equilibrium, than through no cooperation at N, although the equilibrium will be less than the ideal of A.
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These policy equilibria can be translated into the 'cooperate/defect' terminology of Keohane (1984) , Conbeare (1985) and Oye (1992) in their international political economy analyses. 'CC', both players cooperate, is some point on the contract curve AA*. 'DD', both players defect, is point N, the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium. If the first player is a Stackelberg leader, 'CD' corresponds to point S. The final possibility is the first player as a Stackelberg follower, in which case the strategy is described as 'DC'. For the first player the payoff ordering of strategies is CC>DC>CD>DD.
Much of the international economic system is designed to encourage cooperation and avoid mutually destructive behaviour, as represented by the Nash equilibrium 7 . In stable international environments policy makers come to realise what 7 Peter Kenen (1989) distinguishes three types of intergovernmental economic cooperation;: consultation, collaboration, and coordination. Consultation involves an exchange of information without commitment to act on it. Consultations can take place directly among governments, bilaterally and multilaterally, or with the intermediation of international institutions, such as the League of Nations. The advantages of gathering information are clear enough, but the gains to governments from swapping information are not often emphasised nor are the institutions often appreciated that facilitate the process. No government can know as much about other governments' forecasts and plans as it does about its own, and the gains from trade in information may be larger than the gains from other sorts of international cooperation. Consultations may go beyond the mere exchange of information. They can involve interpretation and persuasion, as governments try to change their partners' policies.
Collaboration refers to governments taking specific measures to achieve agreed objectives but not making mutually binding commitments about their national policies. Collaboration is best illustrated by instances involving bilateral or multilateral lending to help a government meet its obligations or pursue its own International institutions may encourage cooperation by making credible both threats of retaliation in the event of 'defection', and promises not to engage in 'beggar thy neighbour' policies. A shortcoming of the nineteenth century MFN approach was the absence of a dispute-settlement procedure (that the World Trade Organisation policy objectives. It is often a matter of implementing 'regime-preserving' policies. In almost every instance, the borrower is expected to modify its policies or take on other obligations. The stabilisation loans of the 1920s, which helped Central European countries return to the gold standard, is an example, as are loans to support countries' adherence to the gold standard in 1931.
Coordination denotes instances in which governments make clearly defined, mutual commitments to alter their own policies in order to pursue a common objective or help each government to pursue its own objectives. Coordination involves a 'package' of policy changes that would not take place in its absence. The mutual commitments may concern to policy targets, or policy instruments. They may involve commensurate objectives, such as growth rates and inflation rates, or comparable instruments, such as tax rate and interest rate changes, but may also involve disparate objectives. The 1930 Tariff Truce whereby signatories agreed not to alter tariffs within a specified period is an example. subsequently to some extent rectified). Consequently there was a stronger chance of trade wars, such as proliferated in the 1930s.
Quantifying Policy Equilibria
To compare policy equilibria we consider those policies obtained when each economy optimises a function in which ideal values of GDP, the consumer price index and the trade balance are those of 1929. Deviations from the ideal values impose penalties that increase quadratically.
Each economy is, at first, allowed one instrument, the tariff. When choosing ideal values of their instruments, policy makers in each economy take the world economy and policies of other countries as given. In the present model domestic policy makers choose the domestic tariff rate (T) to attain the desired combination of GDP, prices (P) and the current account (CB) (specified by the policy cost function C(.) ), given foreign tariff rates (T*), where ^ indicates the desired value of the variable.
C=c1(Y-Y^)
2 + c2 (CB-CB^) 2 + c3 (P-P^) In the short run Y T >0, CB T >0, P T >0, Y T *<0, CB T* <0, P T *<0.
Therefore dT/dT* > 0; reaction functions are positively sloped. A higher tariff in one country contracts economic activity in the other, and therefore triggers a higher foreign tariff. The stability condition (that the home country gradient is steeper than foreign)
follows from spillover effects from the other countries' policy instruments to domestic target variables generally being smaller than the direct impact of own policy instruments on domestic targets (Hughes Hallett 1993).
Some light can be cast on empirical reaction functions by Simmons ' (1994) interwar tariff protection study, if the assumption of 'selfish' and rational optimisation is appropriate 8 . Simmons (1994, ch 7) shows that the level of tariffs (as measured by the ratio of tariff revenue to import value) was positively related to the proportion of customs revenue in total taxes, and negatively related to world trade and trade dependence. Trade concentration is not significant. Belgium maintained little protection and the US chose a great deal because the first country was highly trade dependent and the second was not. When world trade declined, tariffs increased.
Countries that did not greatly depend on customs revenue were more likely to favour low tariffs. Protection was the choice of the centre right and of precariously positioned governments.
Changes in tariff levels were associated with alterations in economic and press harder for the reciprocal Empire preference that she achieved in 1932 as an alternative to the very high tariff she might otherwise have been obliged to adopt to compensate for the damage to her policy objectives. Here we see the tendency to widen the instrument set when optimum instrument values become too extreme. Turning this proposition upside down, we would expect also to find that a wider coordinated national instrument set is better able to achieve national.
The Empirical Modelling of Strategic Tariff Policy
Strategic tariff policy is here modelled on the bilateral trade flows between the US, Britain, France and Germany. The proximate objective of tariff policy was to switch demand from foreign to domestic goods and services by changing a relative price. As explained in Foreman-Peck, Hughes Hallett and Ma (1998) the impact of tariffs is measured by im ji = a 1 y -a 2 p * -a 3 tariff + a 4 p .... (1) where im ji is real into i from j, p is domestic prices, p * is a foreign price index, lagged to avoid feedbacks from imports, e is an exchange rate in domestic currency units per foreign currency unit and all variables are in logs except 'tariff'. We take 'tariff ' to be a binary (on-off) dummy variable 9 .
Simulations of tariff wars are based upon equation (1) The rest of the world is assumed to respond passively in the model, not as strategic players, primarily because of the additional complexity of including more nations. This restriction may not be too much of a handicap for present purposes because if the four largest economies could find a cooperative solution then it was likely the rest of the world would fit in to the institutional arrangements. The trading blocs that did emerge in the 1930s, such as the British Commonwealth, anyway probably were not susceptible to being modelled in the manner employed here.
Simulating Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Tariff Policies
The timing of various impacts are central to understanding tariff policy.
Dynamic multipliers derived from monthly data show initially the US tariff would have boosted GDP, only exercising a negative effect in the third year, assuming the US had not abandoned the gold standard during the period (Foreman-Peck, Hughes Hallett and Ma 1998). The positive effects of the British tariff, under a (hypothetical) fixed exchange rate, lasted longer. Tariffs might therefore be short term national policy instruments to boost GDP, prices and the current balance.
Turning first to the policy equilibria with a tariff as the only policy instrument, we find that ;
• Britain would have been worse off with tariff optimum cooperation compared with optimum non-cooperation.
• The US would also have been worse off unless GDP, rather than national equality, was the basis for cooperation.
• Germany and US apparently had higher optimum tariffs than history in both scenarios.
• Britain could not have financed the optimum cooperative tariff policy.
• The difference between cooperation and non-cooperation on tariff policy is small for the US but large for the UK.
In non-cooperative Nash one instrument equilibrium (Table 1) 1= historical value after the increase. Table 2 Tariff in Nash equilibrium with Fiscal, Discount rate and Tariff However with the single tariff policy instrument for GDP growth the UK is much better off in the Nash than in the cooperative scenario-because of the power of trade switching (Table 3 ). The US on the other hand gains from cooperation in this regard but by little since it is a rather closed economy. For the first three years France achieves slightly more with cooperation than in the Nash scenario. And Germany is a major GDP beneficiary from cooperation rather than non-cooperation. Britain had less to gain from tariff cooperation than the US, as the Keynes tariff proposal implied (Foreman-Peck, Hughes Hallet and Ma 1998; Eichengreen 1990) assuming the gold standard was paramount. France experiences larger negative current balances in the non-cooperative than cooperative policy equilibrium during the first three years. Since this was releasing gold France could well afford to lose, from Britain's position, and insofar as Britain remaining on the gold standard was in French interests, also from France's, the cooperative equilibrium was not superior to the Nash equilibrium. In view of Germany's exiguous exchange reserves and the need to make international transfers, the improved current balance under the cooperative scenario renders cooperation desirable for Germany.
There are of course other rules by which the gains from cooperation could be shared. But agreeing any principles is one of the drawbacks of approximating such equilibria in practice. GDP weighting seems fair but it clearly placed Britain at a disadvantage relative to no cooperation. The most obvious alternative, that reduces the advantage to the US from cooperation and increases the gains for the other three countries, is equal weights-like voting (which may offer a rational basis for US antipathy to the League of Nations). The summary table 4 shows both the US and the UK gain more, as measured by their cost indices, in the non-cooperative equilibrium than in the equal weight cooperative equilibrium. And Nash is better for the British than either cooperative positions. For Germany, the non-cooperative equilibrium is preferable to the GDP weighted cooperative equilbrium (which gives so much help to the US). Both French and German interests are apparently opposed to those of Britain and the US; lowest French and German policy costs of the three tariff equilibria are attained in the equal weight cooperation scenario.
When multiple instruments are permitted in the policy optimisation, the simulations bring out that ;
• The gains from optimum cooperation were small relative to optimum non-cooperation.
• The higher the number of coordinated instruments the less extreme values for each one;
• The more cross-issue cooperation or cooperation by issue, the more stability. On the other hand the variability of the optimum instrument settings suggests such cooperation is more difficult to achieve by discretion.
There is little difference between price movements in the cooperative and Nash scenarios with all policy instruments except the money supply (open market operations). Using three instruments in Nash equilibrium the depression virtually disappears (Table 5) . Tariffs do not rise to actual levels (they are all below 1 at their peaks) and for the first two or three years of the simulation they are well below actual historical levels before the increases of 1930 and after.
The UK current account deficit in 1931 could have been financed, being a little lower than the historical value. The US and French trade balances swing into the red at the end of the period but they too could easily be financed. French and British interest rates fall whereas German rates rise from 1931 to choke the strong recovery of 1933. In practice these optimum results would have been very difficult to attain because of the information requirements and the speed of policy reaction needed. But the principle obtained from comparing optimum policies, that coordination across a broad range of policy instruments within an economy would have yielded the highest returns is not subject to these qualifications. This is also true of the implications that domestic, rather than trade, policies were what needed adjusting over this period.
For all the damage done to trade, trade policy instruments were not powerful means of achieving national targets. Monetary and fiscal policy were far more effective.
With three policy instruments trade controls for all four countries are lower than history in the vital years 1930-1932, even in a non-cooperative equilibrium. The other two instruments -the discount rate and government expenditure-were clearly more potent and more appropriate to the three targets-output, prices and the current balance-than trade controls. National coordination and cooperation were more important than international coordination.
Yet single issue international cooperation was probably easier to achieve than multiple issue national cooperation. The elected government supposedly controlled tariffs and expenditure but was often at the mercy of domestic lobbies. Optimising 'selfish' national monetary policy was difficult enough. Bank of England Governor Montagu Norman failed to see the possibility of a severe run on the pound when he was in the US at the beginning of 1931. Had he done so, he could have arranged a back-up loan at very low cost, and so kept Britain on the gold standard in September, to the benefit of international cooperation. 
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Conclusion
The approach of this paper to addressing the conditions for globalisation has been to estimate the impact of the major trade controls of the world's four largest trading partners during the Great Depression. Then optimal policies were simulated with these instruments targeted on GDP, the current balance and prices in a model of the interaction of the four economies. 
